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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
been specifically decided: The principal case, although doing lip-service
to the right of a creditor to inflict some worry and concern, would
seem to restrict the field of action considerably. It is to be hoped that
the question of whether the creditor has acted justifiably, for which in-
quiry there is already precedent, 24 will be given more weight in the
future.
SAMUEL R. LEAGER.
Wills--Compromise of Caveat Proceedings-Right to Share
in Proceeds of Compromise.
Plaintiffs and defendants were heirs-at-law of one Smith who died
leaving a will under which a $35,000 note was bequeathed to one
Brawley, a stranger to the blood. Defendants notified plaintiffs of
their intention to contest the will and upon being informed by plain-
tiffs that they would have nothing to do with the proceedings, filed a
caveat. Defendants then effected a secret compromise with the legatee
whereby they received $15,000 from him in consideration of their with-
drawal from the contest. Plaintiffs brought this action to recover
$5,000 claiming that they would have been entitled to one-third of the
estate had the will been set aside. Held, a contract to compromise a
caveat proceeding is valid, and as defendants received the money by
virtue of their contract with Brawley, and not by virtue of the laws of
descent and distribution, the plaintiffs were not entitled to a share
therein.'
It is the majority rule that a contest of a will may -be compromised
by the parties to the proceedings2 if there is no fraud or collusion in-
volved,3 and if the parties compromise nothing beyond their own inter-
ests. 4 The courts supporting this rule base their holdings on'the ground
that they do not wish to encourage litigation, and, since the legatees
under a will cannot be made to accept their legacy, they are entitled to
settle disagreements with parties having a valid claim to a caveat, before
a will is probated in solemn form. These courts hold that since caveat
proceedings are in rem, and there are actually no adverse parties, any
' Peoples Finance & Thrift Co. v. Harwell, 82 P. (2d) 994 (Okla. 1938);
Barnett v. Collection Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 1312, 242 N. W. 25, 28 (1932):
"... the door to recovery should be opened but narrowly and with due caution.
A creditor or his agent has a right to urge payment of a just debt and to threaten
to resort to proper legal procedure to enforce such payment."
"Bailey v. McLain, 215 N. C. 150, 1 S. E. (2d) 372 (1939).
2 Dunham v. Slaughter, 268 IIl. 625, 109 N. E. 673 (1915) ; Baxter v. Stephens,
209 Mass. 459, 95 N. E. 854 (1911) ; Schoonmaker v. Gray, 208 N. Y. 209, 101
N. E. 886 (1913) ; Callaghan v. Corbin, 255 N. Y. 401, 175 N. E. 109 (1931) ; It
re Seip's Estate, 163 Pa. 423, 30 At. 226 (1894).
In re Wickersham's Estate, 138 Cal. 355, 70 Pac. 1076 (1903).
'In re Seip's Estate, 163 Pa. 423, 30 Atl. 226 (1894).
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person cited in the proceedings may withdraw at any time for any
reason.
There are a few states, however, notably Wisconsin, which will not
allow such a compromise of proceedings to contest a will, on the ground
that such a compromise is against public policy, as it amounts to an
illegal contract for the purpose of suppressing evidence in a proceeding
before the court.5 These courts also hold that a caveat proceeding is
in rem, but take the view that since such a proceeding has an effect as
against the whole world, the court will complete the proceeding on its
own motion, the issue having been raised, even though one of the parties
withdraws.
In North Carolina any interestea person may file a caveat,0 but all
other persons affected must be cited to "see proceedings" 7 and are bound
by the decision.8 After a caveat has been filed, the court will decide
the issue of devisavit vel non, regardless of objecting parties; and
neither proponent nor contestant may suffer a nonsuit or withdraw the
caveat, nor may the court dismiss the suitY These cases seem to follow
the minority, or Wisconsin, view rather than the majority.
The result of the instant case seems to be inconsistent with the
North Carolina rules governing caveat proceedings. It appears that
the contestants were allowed to do indirectly (compromise the proceed-
ings by withholding evidence), what they could not do directly (com-
promise by withdrawing the caveat). They were allowed to withdraw
in a body, with the result that there was no evidence presented on the
issue of devisavit vel non. Until the principal case was decided, cases
of family settlement' 0 represented the only instances in which the North
Carolina court allowed any compromise of a dispute over a will, but in
this case, the doctrine clearly does not apply, since the legatee was a
stranger in blood to the testator and to the contestants. Although the
present holding appears inconsistent in principle with the earlier de-
cisions, it is at least arguable that the court has now adopted a sounder
point of view in this particular situation in the light of the reasons
advanced by the courts adopting the majority rule.
" Lazenby v. Lazenby, 132 Ga. 829, 65 S. E. 120 (1909) ; In re Staab's Estate,
166 Wis. 587, 166 N. W. 326 (1918) ; Taylor v. Hoyt, 207 Wis. 520, 24Z N. W.
141 (1932).
N. C_ CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §4158.
Id. §4159.
'Redmond v. Collins, 15 N. C. 430 (1834); see Mills v. Mills, 195 N. C. 595,
597, 143 S. E. 130, 132 (1928).
o Hutson v. Sawyer, 104 N. C. 1, 10 S. E. 85 (1889); see Collins v. Collins,
125 N. C_ 98, 104, 34 S. E. 195 (1890) ; In re Westfeldt, 188 N. C. 702, 705, 125
S. E. 531, 533 (1924).
20 Tise v. Hicks, 191 N. C. 609, 132 S. E. 560 (1926); see In re Will of Mc-
Lelland, 207 N. C. 375, 376, 177 S. E. 19, 20 (1934); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 208
N. C. 578, 622, 182 S. E. 341, 347 (1935).
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Assuming that the compromise of a caveat is valid, what effect
does such a compromise have on parties not actively participating in
the caveat or in the compromise? There is very little authority involv-
ing this direct point. In re Seip's Estate," a Pennsylvania case, allowed
a party cited inadvertently as a proponent, but who paid part of the
expenses of the contest, to recover a part of the proceeds of the com-
promise. However, the court said that it was not necessary that the
party claiming part of the compromise money take an active part in the
caveat proceedings, since all persons must be brought in, and, if notice
of the compromise was not given to all interested parties the party not
receiving notice might have the verdict, handed down on the contest
proceedings, set aside.1'2
In a later Pennsylvania case13 the plaintiff asked to have an appeal
from probate proceedings reinstated after defendants had compromised
the proceedings. Plaintiff sought relief under a statute14 allowing com-
promise of will disputes, but which provides that if a compromise is
made without notice to all interested parties, the party not receiving
notice may have the verdict set aside and the caveat reinstated. Plain-
tiff had received no notice, but failed to have the proceedings reinstated,
for the reason that plaintiff was not an interested party under the act.
However, the court said by way of dictum: "Clearly, active contestants
to a will may not secretly agree to settle their contest to the prejudice
of other parties in interest, whose inactivity may be due to a justified
reliance upon the active parties to see that the contest is prosecuted to
a deliberate conclusion by the court ...likewise where contestants of
a will receive money in virtue of a settlement of the contest, they may
not exclude from a share therein one who is equally entitled, although
not an active contestant of the will and not a party to the settlement."'u
Jenness v. Ambler,16 a New Hampshire case, followed by the court
in the instant case, did not allow recovery when a party who refused
to join in the appeal of the probate later sued to share in the money
paid under a compromise agreement. The court held that it was in-
equitable to allow the plaintiff to recover when she had a chance to aid
in the appeal and refused to do so. This case is distinguishable from
the principal case because the plaintiff had notice of the compromise and
also refused to sign an agreement drawn up by the heirs-at-law provid-
ing for a committee to negotiate with the legatee and for distribution
of the proceeds of any compromise among them, whereas, in the prin-
cipal case the plaintiff had no notice of the compromise. But the court
" 163 Pa. 423, 30 At. 226 (1894). 12 Id. at 433, 30 Atl. at 227.
" In re Crawford's Estate, 320 Pa. 444, 182 Atl. 252 (1936).
1" PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 20, §787.
" See In re Crawford's Estate, 320 Pa. 444, 447, 182 Atl. 252, 253 (1936).16 62 N. H. 569 (1883).
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in Jenness v. Ambler made no mention of the effect of notice on the
plaintiff's right to recover, basing its decision solely on the plaintiff's
refusal to join in the contest in any way.
Of the 'two views, apparent in these cases, the better rule would
seem to be that which allows a party having no notice of the compro-
mise to recover a part of the proceeds thereof, even though such party
did not engage in the caveat. If the caveat had been prosecuted to a
successful conclusion, such party would have shared in the proceeds,
therefore he should share in the compromise. Even if he is allowed to
reinstate the proceedings, it is possible that he might have no evidence
on which to base a caveat. This rule would also serve to prevent one
group of heirs-at-law from defrauding another group by making a
secret compromise with the legatee.
On the other hand, where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff has
an opportunity to participate in the caveat and refuses, it may be argued
that he is in no position to demand participation in the benefits produced
by the diligence of the caveator, even though the benefits of the caveat
would have enured to the plaintiff if the proceeding had been prosecuted
to a successful conclusion.
The better result might be achieved by the adoption in North Car-
olina of a statute similar to the Pennsylvania act.1 7 However, such a
statute should state clearly whether the party not receiving notice of
the compromise is confined to the remedy of reinstatement of the pro-
ceedings or whether such a party might also sue for a share in the
proceeds of the compromise.
FRANK N. PATTERSON, JR.
'7 PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 20, §7870
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